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The Prose and the Passion: the call of an Australian Constitutional Epic
“[S]he might yet be able to help him to the building of the rainbow bridge that should connect the
prose in us with the passion. Without it we are meaningless fragments….”1
“Darryl: ‘I’m really startin’ to understand how the Aborigines feel.’
Sal: ‘You been drinking?’”1

E.M. Forster’s Howards End is a story about English national identity of a particular
kind: a “reverse postcolonial” fantasy of origins impelled by unavoidably insistent
analogies between colonial oppression and a culture tolerant at home as abroad of violent
hierarchies of race, gender and class. Forster’s oeuvre more generally insists on the
ethical necessity of seizing the English “constitutional moment” potentiated by the
collapse of Empire, on rigorous national self-scrutiny used to imagine a postcolonial
English national identity. And Margaret Schlegel’s famous meditation on connection
might make a proxy at once rough and convenient for therapeutic claims for “Law and
Literature” of the kind that holds that literature’s feminine supplement might restore Law
to Justice.

More thoughtful, less naïve, is Peter Goodrich’s insight that

The relation of literature to law is a question of genre…. [T]he status of
the legal genre is predicated upon a paradox. Law is a literature which
denies its literary qualities. It is a play of words which asserts an absolute
seriousness; it is a genre of rhetoric which represses its moments of
invention or of fiction; it is a language which hides its indeterminacy in
the justificatory discourse of judgment; it is a procedure based upon
analogy, metaphor and repetition and yet it lays claim to being a cold or
disembodied prose, a science without either poetry or desire; it is a
narrative which assumes the epic proportions of truth; it is, in short, a
speech or writing which forgets the violence of the word and the terror or
jurisdiction of the text. Law, conceived as a genre of literature and as a
practice of poetics, can thus only be understood through the very act of
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forgetting, through the denial, the negation, or the repression by means of
which it institutes its identity, its life, its fictive forms.2
In the aftermath of colonial violence, then, so such a Law and Literature project might
insist, the nation responsible for that violence must reimagine, envision, dream itself into
being, but if it does so without insistently remembering its origins and its history, it will
be at a considerable price.

Australia’s postcolonial circumstances are particularly complicated ones. This is because
the appeal to address what David Marr and Marian Wilkinson call “its ghosts,” and to
“enlarge the [nation’s] spirit”3 emerges as strongly – perhaps more strongly - from inside
the nation’s borders as from without. It is also because Australia has engaged in
neocolonial practices in the “postcolonial” period, for example in the “Pacific Solution”
to the claims of asylum seekers in 2001 that Marr and Wilkinson document in Dark
Victory.

The late Robert Cover, the Yale Law School scholar/teacher/visionary/activist, reached
an insight like Goodrich’s in Nomos and Narrative, a candidate as plausible for “The
Great American Constitutional Law and Literature” text as Toni Morrison’s Beloved is
for the Great American Novel, or David Malouf’s An Imaginary Life for the Great
Australian Novella. “The uncontrolled character of meaning,” Cover wrote,2 “exercises a
destabilizing influence upon power.” I will return to that insight later in this essay, but for
now want to focus on Cover’s special pleading for Constitutional Law and Literature.
The law and its texts of judgment are always critical sites for constituting the nation. Law
and Literature scholar Drucilla Cornell registers that laying down the law negotiates “the
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relationship between the past, embodied in the normative conventions which are passed
down through legal precedent, and the projection of future ideals through which the
[imagined juridical and national] community seeks to regulate itself.”4 Or, as Cover puts
it, “[l]aw may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of reality to
an imagined alternative.”5 Cover’s thesis about explicitly constitutional literature is that
“[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning,” and thus that “[f]or every constitution there is an epic.”6

What candidates, then, do we have for an Australian constitutional epic, and what might
we learn from it? Legal “factions,” artful representations of the real, like Truman
Capote’s In Cold Blood, have an especially strong claim to be law’s narrative
supplements: their inhabiting of the borderlands of fact and fiction, law and literary
journalism, make them generic doubles for the texts of judgment. Both genres – faction
and what Australians call judgments and Americans legal opinions - make coherent and
thus satisfactory narratives out of the messy contingency of evidence and the everyday, at
the same time unwittingly drawing attention to the author’s editorial legerdemain and
normative vision. In Cold Blood exemplifies Cover’s insight that the complex contested
meanings that we make from our engagement with narrative have a peculiar aptitude to
unsettle law’s totalizing claims to normative authority and interpretive orthodoxy: there is
more than one way to read the law, and thus to make it. As Cover also registers, those
who write a nation’s epic make choices about the ancestors they invoke, as do
constitutional courts. “The normative universe,” of the nation, he observes, “is held
together by the force of interpretive commitments – some small and private, others

immense and public. These commitments – of officials and of others – do determine what
the law means and what law shall be.”7

Capote told the nation and its people a story of the pathology constitutive of their society
and the law that was made and administered in their name. At the same time he
manifested both the allure and the risks of an advocate getting “too close to the client.”
Australian equivalents to In Cold Blood arguably include Helen Garner’s two
controversial forays into the faction genre, The First Stone and Joe Cinque’s Consolation,
although for my taste and judgment, inhabiting as I do - as a result of training and
professional experience in both - the worlds of law and of literature, they fail to satisfy.
For a reader dwelling at once inside and outside “law’s empire,” their limitation lies in
Garner’s stubborn novelist’s insistence that law do more than it can, tell a story as
complete and rich in nuance as can fictional narrative, at the same time responding to
Garner’s demands for a congruence between law’s judgment and her powerful vision of
justice. The law as such, as a ragtag system constituted by institutions, discourses, and
subjects, predictable only because of the iteration of practices passed from hand to hand,
always falls short.

Garner’s assessment of law’s inadequacy is also shaped by her novelist’s forensic instinct
and her great strength as an historian and elegist of the domestic, while mine is shaped by
the practices of law teaching and public law scholarship, by the press of institutional
hierarchies that drives home the message that “women’s business” is risky professional
ground. While her focus in Joe Cinque’s Consolation is on the law’s failure to do justice
to the life of Joe Cinque and the loss of his family, I came away from the book wondering

what I could make of what could be learned from Anu Singh’s law school teachers and
classmates about the histories of her acts of lawlessness, what that could teach us about
how we educate lawyers, or should or might educate them, and the rueful recognition that
beyond the shadow or canopy of the First Amendment, much of what I might learn might
not be publishable.

More satisfying for this reader, genuinely products of both law and of literature in its
literary journalistic genre, are John Bryson’s Evil Angels, and David Marr and Marian
Wilkinson’s Dark Victory, both of which deliver, like Capote’s masterwork, judgments
about law and society, and thus about nation. These ostensibly non-fictional texts perform
the telling of the – or a - whole truth, while demonstrating the limits of journalism and of
law to truth-telling. They insist on law’s human and practical dimensions: if the law is to
do justice, it will depend on the people who practice it and lay it down, on their
characters, their courage, their convictions, on how they read the nation’s legal history,
and write it.

Evil Angels and Dark Victory, then, share an interest in the role legal actors, judges and
lawyers, play in the epic of Australian national identity. In Evil Angels Bryson, a lawyer
by training and at his best as a writer in the genre of literary journalism, uses the
characters of the Melbourne barrister Andrew Kirkham and Sydney journalist Malcolm
Brown as stalking horses for his dissection of a grim pettiness and hostility to people who
are “not like us” that characterize Anglo-Australia at its worst, and of how the law
becomes complicit in and compounds this moral failing of the dominant national culture
when due process is no more than “surreal epistemology.”8 Marr and Wilkinson likewise

show what happens when majoritarian democracy becomes tolerant of the Schmittian
nightmare of an endless “state of exception,” where the potent fictions of the rule of law
become no more than cynical sham, and “[n]ascent racism, ancient fears of invasion by
immigration and talkback radio ranting about Asian [and Muslim] crime”9 become the
dominant cultural story, circumscribe the majority’s national imaginary, their vision of
how the nation’s past might shape its future.

In writing this essay, I returned to read Evil Angels after a gap of more than a decade, and
discovered that I had forgotten that it begins with the bathos of a failed second coming
awaited by Adventists on the banks of the Schuylkill river at Phoenixville, a few miles
from where I now live and work. But I had vividly remembered Bryson’s account of
Kirkham losing his patience with Lindy Chamberlain:

Her demeanor in the witness stand worried Kirkham. When she was
annoyed with Barker she sounded like a fish-wife.
‘I know it’s difficult for you,’ Kirkham said, ‘but you must hold
your temper. You sound too harsh, too angry.’
‘I am angry,’ she said. ‘What do you expect?’
‘It’s not going to go over well with the jury. Try to be more,’ he
cast around, ‘demure.’
She was angry all over again. ‘I am the way I am,’ she said. ‘the
jury will have to get used to it.’
Plainly she was not prepared to take notice of him. He glared at
her. Kirkham’s eyes are generally described as ‘piercing blue’. Whatever
goes on in there in the midst of fury, it is not the abode of warmth.
‘Understand this,’ he said, in a glacial voice, ‘When this case is over, I am
going to climb on a plane and get the heel out of the place. You could be
staying here for a fucking long time.’10

Bryson’s characterization of Kirkham evokes one aspect what I recall of Australian
lawyers at their best: independence from the client, a willingness to give unwelcome
advice if professional judgment demanded it. That independence also enables the best of
Australia’s lawyers and the judges some of them become to be fiercely protective of what
the rule of law can mean if it is precept, not cipher, article of faith, not rhetoric. Writing
from a nation where the most recent appointee to the Supreme Court fawningly touted his
conservative credentials when seeking an Executive government appointment early in his
career, and where the paradigmatic client of the Constitutional lawyers who constitute a
significant number of the Supreme Court bench is the government, those lawyers seem
worth recognizing. The appeal to recognize them becomes insistent in an age where it is
increasingly evident that all that stands between individuals, especially the powerless
ones among us, and raw, unchecked government power, are those members of the legal
profession who are willing to speak truth to power.

An impulse to recognize the value of courageous legal and other professionals is
evidently shared by Marr and Wilkinson, who relentlessly document the calculated
exclusion of lawyers, doctors, and journalists from access to the asylum seekers on the
Tampa and its successor SIEVs (suspect illegal entry vessels) as from high level Howard
government decisionmaking, and the equally calculated Americanization of the
Australian federal civil service. Accordingly, beyond a comparatively brief description of
the Federal Court challenge to the detention of those asylum-seekers held on the Tampa,
lawyers are signally absent from Dark Victory. As a result of government policy, the law
in any form other than fiat was likewise absent from Australia’s conduct in respect of
asylum seekers in the period from August to November, 2001. Worse than that can

happen to constitutionalism, of course, and texts which gesture towards what that worst
might be are the “torture memos” written by Jay Bybee and John Yoo, then both of the
increasingly inaptly-named Justice Department, now a federal appellate judge and Boalt
Hall law professor respectively, lawyers far too close to their client, executive
government, with little awareness of being servants of the law. One might find equally
troubling legal texts in the “outsider jurisprudence” of the High Court in the period after
Marr’s and Wilkinson’s epic concludes.

As both Evil Angels and Dark Victory share identity as constitutional epics, they in turn
share their interest in the role of legal actors in the epic of Australian national identity
with an accidental constitutional epic, Rob Sitch’s The Castle. While I might have been
struck anew by the profundity of Cover’s insights as I taught Comparative Constitutional
Law this past semester, one of my students was insistent that The Castle had given him a
more acute insight into constitutionalism than any of the constitutional theory we read. It
conveyed the same message again and again, he said: “Constitutionalism,” for which a
rough proxy might be living under a genuine rather than rhetorical rule of law, one that
applies to the governors as much as to the governed, or provides meaningful protections
for citizens from government tyranny, “matters to all of us.”

The Castle is a slippery text: on one hand, it makes a case for both the land rights of
Australia’s indigenous peoples and the virtues to an Antipodean Everyman of the Mabo
decision. On the other, it has a Borat problem. That is, it is arguably implicated in the
racism it satirizes, perhaps most evidently in the character Farouk, portrayed by Costas
Kilias (himself a lawyer) as a Lebanese immigrant so blind to cultural context that an

injunction to wear a suit to court sees him attend in dodgy black tie, and whose response
to a threat to back off legal action against the forced acquisition of his modest suburban
Melbourne house or risk a beating (delivered by Les Toth’s Anglo-Australian thug, who,
to this former Sydney lawyer, having once inadvertently spent the prison officers’ lunch
hour locked in a cell at Pentridge with Mark Alfred Clarkson, stereotypically evokes
Melbourne’s gangland) is “‘You have friend, I have friend, my friend come to your
house, put bomb under your car and blow you to fucking sky.’” As he reflects, reassuring
his neighbours, “I don’t really have friend like this, but, you know, I’m Arab, and people
think all Arab we have bomb.”

The movie’s most unselfconscious passage, however, is in the representation of
“Lawrie,” “Lawrence Hammill, or “Mr. Hammill,” the Melbourne Silk with a heart of
gold, and a deft and paradoxically genuine common touch. Charles Tingwell’s character
is the hero who saves Darryl Kerrigan’s “Castle,” a house that only a mother could love,
from the rapacious developer who, in an uncannily prescient gesture towards the recent
controversial U.S. “takings” case, Kelo, is a private corporate wolf in the sheep’s clothing
of a governmental authority. Queen’s Counsel and towtruck driver meet during a hiatus
in Court proceedings: Darryl is there for his ill-fated appeal to the Federal Court; Lawrie
to see his son admitted to the bar. Darryl, in whom the obtuse and the acute struggle for
ascendancy, recognizes what they have in common: children whose achievements they
celebrate, whether those achievements are a hairdressing certificate from Sunshine TAFE
or a clutch of University degrees from what is apparently an “Australian Ivy.”

Darryl’s haplessness and Candide-like frankness, and his various appeals to their shared
humanity, evidently make Lawrie reflect, and then act, in an attempt to make
constitutionalism intervene in a struggle between David and Goliath, or Darryl and a
State acting as a lackey to ruthless commerce. Not only does he arrive out of the blue at
the despondent Kerrigans’ door on the eve of the threatened dispossession of the home
that is their castle to offer to appeal their case pro bono to the High Court, but he wins the
case by recognizing and convincing the Court of the merits of Aussie Everyman Darryl’s
lyrical tribute to home and family. He goes on to secure parole for Darryl’s eldest son,
Wayne, serving an armed robbery conviction, and to become Darryl’s mate.

Some might judge The Castle, then, the cinematic double of the Mabo decision itself,
which, as Elizabeth Povinelli argues, can be read as an attempt to redeem the common
law from the stain of colonialism. Others might dissent, as Noel Pearson did in his
scathing judgment of what the Yorta Yorta Court had made in 2002 of the flawed but
historic promise of Mabo. In the ominously precedential Yorta Yorta decision, the Court
concluded, 5:2, that the Native Title Act recognized only those interests in land “rooted in
traditional law and custom,” that is, effectively frozen in time in 1788, at the point of the
British “Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and radical title” to the lands that were made
to constitute Australia. The failure of the Yorta Yorta claim resulted from the insistence
of the Chief Justice and Justices Gummow and Hayne (with whom Justice Callinan and a
grudging Michael McHugh concurred) that only rights and interests in land deriving from
traditional law and customs existing as at 1788 “that [have] had a continuous existence
and vitality” until the present day are recognizable under the Act. The alternative – which

Justice McHugh reasoned was what the Keating government had intended in passing the
Native Title Act - would potentially have been genuinely redemptive of Australia’s
common law: it would have enabled the incidents of Native Title to “be determined in
accordance with the developing common law” of Australia.

“The present High Court,” Pearson wrote, in passing judgment on the Yorta Yorta
decision, “does not know what it is doing with the responsibility which their predecessors
assumed with Mabo.”11 As Pearson dissented from the judgment of a majority of the
Court in 2002, so I will elect to do from my first account of Sitch’s film, reading The
Castle through the lenses of history, expatriation, and teaching and writing about
comparative constitutional law, a field of study that owes its modern origins to the
aftermath of what Michael Kirby, increasingly a comparative constitutionalist’s
constitutionalist, described in his at once stinging and agonized 2004 dissent in Fardon:
the original Schmittian nightmare, that paradigmatic “state of exception” constituted by
the governance of Germany from 1933 to 1945.

What The Castle might teach us is that good lawyers take pains to bring constitutional
challenges on behalf of the poor and disenfranchised and unpopular who are their fellows
and their equals, the paradigms of whom in recent Australian constitutional history have
been what are called in the U.S. “sexually violent predators” like the litigants in the 2004
decisions Fardon and Baker, and the asylum seekers and immigration detainees who
were the subject of a trio of 2004 High Court decisions, Al Kateb, Behrooz, Re Woolley,
and the 2005 decision Ruhani, all of these latter companion texts to Dark Victory. It

might lead us to interrogate Justice McHugh’s exasperated evaluation of Wik in Ward
(2002) as “one of the most controversial decisions of this court…. [which] subjected the
Court to unprecedented criticism and abuse.” It might counsel that, as Justice McHugh’s
subsequent reference to the greater criticism and abuse directed towards the U.S.
Supreme Court in the wake of Brown might suggest, it might properly be said to be a
duty of Constitutional judges to make unpopular decisions when, to paraphrase “the other
Coke,” the New Zealand jurist Sir Robin Cooke, later Baron Cooke of Thorndon,
executive or legislature impinge on common law constitutional protections of individuals
against the incidents of what I will mindfully call tyranny, particularly the right to
genuine judicial review that was in varying ways at issue in the recent Australian sexually
violent predator and asylum seeker litigation.

Justices Gummow and Hayne were rather more robust invokers of rights culture than I
have been in this essay in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case, decided in 1998, the year I
left Australia to live and work in the U.S.: they wrote of “fundamental common law
rights” and invoked Dixon J’s statement in the Australian Communist Party Case that the
Constitution “may fairly be said” to assume “the rule of law.” It is against that Australian
judiciary, symbolized too by the judgments of Chief Justice Street and Justice Priestley of
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the BLF Case, that one might measure the High
Court’s recent jurisprudence characterizing judicial power.

Since 1998 such a thick understanding of common law constitutionalism has largely been
replaced with a Court arguably more concerned about its own legitimacy than with

developing its constitutional expertise, a charge leveled by the Yale Constitutional
scholar Paul Kahn at the Rehnquist Court in the wake of Bush v. Gore. Common law
constitutionalism is heard most notably in Justice Kirby’s increasingly distinct and
dissentient jurisprudential voice, more fleetingly elsewhere, as when Chief Justice
Gleeson and Justice Gummow joined Justice Kirby in a dissent in Al-Kateb, invoking the
“principle of legality, which governs both Parliament and the courts,” but envisioning the
role of an Australian constitutional court as akin to that of British courts before the
passage of the Human Rights Act:
[i]n exercising their judicial function, courts seek to give effect to the will
of Parliament by declaring the meaning of what Parliament has enacted.
Courts do not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail
certain human rights or freedoms (of which personal liberty is the most
basic) unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous
language, which indicates that the legislature has directed its attention to
the rights or freedoms in question, and has consciously decided on
abrogation or curtailment.

It might judge equally harshly Justice McHugh’s suggestion in Ward that the persisting
foundational constitutional injury to Australia’s indigenous citizens is both beyond the
capacity of law to redress and that (common) law has no role in declaring what
indigenous “rights ought to be,” a role apparently recognized in his Yorta Yorta dissent,
and his conclusion that, absent a written Bill of Rights, Ahmed Al-Kateb’s indefinite
detention by legislatively-authorized executive fiat is the business of the tragedian but not
of the jurist. Finally, it might direct the retired justice, an attentive if sometimes selective
scholar of U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence, to the remarks made by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, who, in 1949, in Mapp v. Ohio, signally called one aspect of the rights one
has in the home qua castle “human rights,” to Haim Cohn, David Ben-Gurion’s emissary

to the Supreme Court Justices to get advice about an Israeli constitution: “What you need
are independent judges, not a written constitution.”12 The Gleeson Court seems
determined to see only a “written constitution,” putting their (at best naïve) faith in
narrow textualism, looking back to an exceptionalist past for guidance to our shared
future rather than to the lessons of history. One such lesson, starkly visible to a
comparative common law constitutionalist, might be that the Warren Court’s
jurisprudence was a signal if now much-eroded chapter in rewriting the grimly racist
majoritarian narrative constitutive of a nation.
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